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Abstract
In the last couple of years, the rise of Artificial Intelligence and the
successes of academic breakthroughs in the field have been inescapable.
Vast sums of money have been thrown at AI start-ups. Many existing
tech companies—including the giants like Google, Amazon, Facebook, and
Microsoft–have opened new research labs. The rapid changes in these
everyday work and entertainment tools have fueled a rising interest in
the underlying technology itself; journalists write about AI tirelessly, and
companies—-of tech nature or not–brand themselves with AI, Machine
Learning or Deep Learning whenever they get a chance. Confronting
squarely this media coverage, several analysts are starting to voice con-
cerns about over-interpretation of AI’s blazing successes and the some-
times poor public reporting on the topic. This paper reviews briefly the
track-record in AI and Machine Learning and finds this pattern of early
dramatic successes, followed by philosophical critique and unexpected dif-
ficulties, if not downright stagnation, returning almost to the clock in
30-year cycles since 1958.
1 Introduction
The recent practical successes [26] of Artificial Intelligence (AI) programs of the
Reinforcement Learning and Deep Learning varieties in game playing, natural
language processing and image classification, are now calling attention to the
envisioned pitfalls of their hypothetical extension to wider domains of human
behavior. Several voices from the industry and academia are now routinely
raising concerns over the advances [49] of often heavily media-covered represen-
tatives of this new generation of programs such as Deep Blue, Watson, Google
Translate, AlphaGo and AlphaZero.
Most of these cutting-edge algorithms generally fall under the class of su-
pervised learning, a branch of the still evolving taxonomy of Machine Learning
techniques in AI research. In most cases the implementation choice is artificial
neural networks software, the workhorse of the Connectionism school of thought
in both AI and Cognitive Psychology.
Confronting the current wave of connectionist architectures, critics usually
raise issues of interpretability (Can the remarkable predictive capabilities be
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trusted in real-life tasks? Are these capabilities transferable to unfamiliar situ-
ations or to different tasks altogether? How informative are the results about
the real world; about human cognition? Can we infer sound causal relation-
ships and natural explanations from them?). Others evoke higher concerns that
still reverberate in Cognitive Psychology and in the Philosophy of Mind: neu-
ral plausibility of the current game-adept generation of connectionism, proper
accounting for minimum innate preconditions in perception in artificial and hu-
man subjects, psychological value of laws about local, incremental connections of
sub-conceptual units – at work in artificial neurons – versus laws about general,
complex properties of large-scale representations – found in concepts, categories,
and logical rules.
Recently, ethical and moral questions were also addressed at the AI research
community in the context of practical public applications of the current crop of
results and their impact on society (unemployment, inequality, humanity, error
correction, bias, security, unintended consequences, singularity, robot rights [3]).
This paper offers a tentative review of the roots of the growing controversy
over the interpretation of AI research results, in the two previous occurrences
of this same discussion, only 30 years apart. Perusing the well-documented
approach [53, 7] of elevating the status of the AI artifacts produced by research
groups to one of boundary object with other disciplines, we argue that the current
wave of critical analyses re-enacts what looks like a 30-year cyclic pattern in the
discussion of AI.
2 Pattern
2.1 The Advent of Modern Computers: Connectionism
and Electronic Brains
In a Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory Technical Report dated January 1957
[42], Frank Rosenblatt (1928-1971) suggested that a brain model, based on his
independent research on physiological psychology, should be built, not only to
demonstrate the workability of the Perceptron, as it was named, but as a research
tool for further study of the principles it employed:
• dependence on probabilities rather than on deterministic principles for its
operations, and
• reliability gained from the properties of statistical measurements obtained
on large populations of elements.
The external description of the Perceptron borrows heavily from behaviorism,
which at the time was prevalent in empirical psychology, with its characteristic
explanatory tools of input-input and input-output associations (e.g. in classical
conditioning), and the reward-punishment track record shaping behavior (e.g.
operant conditioning). In its “photoperceptron” instantiation, the electronic or
electromechanical device performance is described as a process of learning to
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give the same output signal for all optical stimuli belonging to some arbitrarily
constituted class. Rosenblatt summarized experimental results:
“Simple cognitive sets, selective recall, and spontaneous recognition
of the classes present in a given environment are possible.”
Based on these successes, ambitious goals were claimed for the project PARA
(Perceiving And Recognizing Automaton):
“[. . . ] with the objective of designing, fabricating, and evaluating
an electronic brain model, the photoperceptron. The proposed pi-
lot model will be capable of ‘learning’ responses to ordinary visual
patterns or forms. The system will employ a new theory of mem-
ory storage (the theory of statistical separability), which permits
the recognition of complex patterns with an efficiency far greater
than that attainable by existing computers. Devices of this sort
are expected ultimately to be capable of concept formation, lan-
guage translation, collation of military intelligence, and the solution
of problems through inductive logic.”
and the initial results impressive and broadly publicized in the scientific (and
defense) community.
2.2 The Advent of Modern Computers: Thought and Me-
chanical Information Processing
On the same year, 1957, Allen Newell (1927-1992), John C. Shaw (1922-1991)
and Herbert A. Simon (1916-2001) commented on empirical explorations with
the modern computer in their Logic Theorist (LT). They sought a proper def-
inition of heuristics as a basis for a theory of general problem solving. LT is
a computer programmed to the specifications of a system for finding proofs of
theorems in elementary logic, a step in an articulated research program on com-
plex information-processing systems. This program culminated in 1961 with the
seminal paper by Allen Newell and Herbert Simon introducing GPS (General
Problem Solver) [50] a “program that simulates human thought”.
Logic Theorist soon proved 38 of the first 52 theorems in chapter 2 of the
Principia Mathematica. The proof of theorem 2.85 was actually advocated
as more elegant than the proof produced laboriously by hand by Russell and
Whitehead. GPS solved problems in symbolic logic and in trigonometry.
The experimental results led the authors to posit the GPS specification,
abstracted from the symbolic logic task at hand to any task environment, as a
theory of human problem solving. Simon’s enthusiastic claims summed it up:
“Subsequent work has tended [. . . ] to demonstrate that heuristics,
or rules of thumb, form the integral core of human problem-solving
processes. As we begin to understand the nature of the heuristics
that people use in thinking, the mystery begins to dissolve from such
vaguely understood processes as ‘intuition’ and ‘judgment’.”
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As a theory GPS is successful at explaining the human subject problem-
solving behavior, as manifested in the almost perfect match of trace and proto-
col, relying on a model of symbol manipulations the complexity of which became
addressable thanks recent advances made in artificial intelligence, programming,
and modern computers at the time. And to quote the authors’ conclusion: “al-
though we know this only for small fragment of behavior, the depth of the
explanation is striking”.
2.3 The Philosophical Critique (1958)
Not so striking though to the eyes of the likes of philosophers Jacques Ellul
(1912-1994) [15] and specially Hubert L. Dreyfus (1929-2017) who engaged right
from these early sixties into decades-long systematic debunking of the fanciest
claims by the originators of the field of AI.
In a widely disseminated article, aptly titled Alchemy and Artificial Intelli-
gence [10], Dreyfus took stock of the then current state of the art and identified
a pattern that proved recurrent:
“The field of artificial intelligence exhibits a recurrent pattern: early,
dramatic success followed by sudden unexpected difficulties.”
Dreyfus already read definite signs of stagnation in such typical AI research
domains as language translation, game playing, pattern recognition, and prob-
lem solving. These negative results are in fact significant argues Dreyfus and
should be given full consideration if progresses are to be made in the field. In
Dreyfus’s analysis, a system that could equal human performance at recogniz-
ing patterns, far from being readily available in 1958 as prematurely announced
e.g. by Oliver G. Selfridge (1926-2008) in his landmark paper, Pandemonium:
A Paradigm For Learning [48], should be able to:
• distinguish the essential from the inessential features of a particular in-
stance of a pattern;
• use cues that remain on the fringes of consciousness;
• take account of the context; and
• perceive the individual as typical (as opposed to generic).
Furthermore, admonished Dreyfus, serious misconceptions masked the serious-
ness of these required abilities. Namely the assumption of “workers in cognitive
simulation” that human and mechanical information processing involve the same
elementary process.
So does Dreyfus’s stern 1958 conclusion that “confidence of progress in cog-
nitive simulation is thus as unfounded as the associationist assumption” leaves a
silver lining, that “this realization, however, leaves untouched the weaker claim
[. . . ] that human intelligent behavior – not human information processing – can
be simulated by using digital computers”? Not even, says Dreyfus who raised a
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computing power argument: “We do not know the equations of the physical pro-
cesses in the brain, and even if we did, the solutions of the equations describing
the simplest reaction would take a prohibitive amount of time”.
Instead, Dreyfus defined a role for AI research if directed at areas of in-
telligent activity categorized at level 3 on a 1-to-4 scale of “associationistic”,
“non-formal”, “simple formal”, and “complex formal”. Not that effort in areas
2 (problems where insight and perceptive guesses are required, translation of
natural languages, recognition of varied and distorted patterns) and 4 (incom-
putable games – chess and go, mentioned – and complex combinatory problems,
or recognition of complex patterns in noise) would be wasted but would only
bear fruition when, following a remark of Claude E. Shannon (1916-2001):
“efficient machines for such problem as pattern recognition, language
translation, and so on, may require a different type of computer than
any we have today. It is my feeling that this computer will be so
organized that single components do not carry out simple, easily
described functions”
would become available. So that the critical remarks of Dreyfus can be
understood as extending also to the contemporary Rosenblatt’s photoperceptron
as a step towards an electronic brain.
The actual death spell to Rosenblatt’s perceptron intuition, inspired by the
works of Donald O. Hebb (1904-1985) in 1949, and of Warren S. McCulloch
(1898-1965) andWalter H. Pitts (1923-1969) in 1943, was pronounced by Marvin
Minksy (1927-2016) and Seymour Papert (1928-2016) in their 1969 book Per-
ceptrons: An Introduction to Computational Geometry (note the subtitle)[36].
Rosenblatt’s early success demonstrated that what is today called an artifi-
cial neural net may, but need not, allow a conceptual interpretation of its hidden
units (the intermediate nodes between input and output). In the Gestalt-Holist
view, nodes or pattern of nodes are not required to actually pick out fixed
(micro) feature of the domain. Minsky and Papert’s destruction of the origi-
nal Perceptron is as much based on the technical limitations of the one-layer
contraption in failing to calculate mathematical (symbolic) functions such as
parity, connectedness and logical “exclusive or (XOR)” as on the philosophical
defense of a rationalist tradition supporting representational states of mind and
symbolic manipulation against holism.
2.4 The Advent of Modern Computational Minds: Con-
nectionism and Parallel Distributed Processing
The counter-arguments, inter alia, contributed to tip the internal war between
the two research programs towards the surprising asymmetrical victory of the
symbolic representation scientific community. Those researchers who proposed
using the (modern) digital computer as symbol manipulators in the 70s and
early 80s had almost undisputed control of the research funding resources, grad-
uate programs, research journals, symposia and conferences and started making
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inroads into connected communities in psychology, operations research, man-
agement and philosophy.
Nonetheless small research groups around David E. Rumelhart (1942-2011),
James L. McClelland of the Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) group , Ge-
offrey E. Hinton, Terrence J. Sejnowski, John R. Anderson, often sourcing their
model scenarios from psycholinguistics and memory studies, looked to paral-
lelism as a theoretical and practical response to the previous decade attacks
on connectionism. So quick and striking were their successes in the early and
mid-eighties that Paul Smolensky [52] could write in 1988:
“In the past half-decade the connectionist approach to cognitive
modeling has grown from an obscure cult claiming a few true believ-
ers to a movement so vigorous that recent meetings of the Cognitive
Science Society have begun to look like connectionist pep rallies.”
Artifacts produced in this program, and variously called Boltzmann Machines,
Hopfield Nets, PARSNIP, Parallel Distributed Processing Architecture), and
their surprisingly efficient performances soon found their way to wider pub-
lic exposure both in the scientific and general press of the time. In 1987, for
instance, a review of the PDP Group’s published works in the New York Times
(soberly) concluded:
“[. . . ] connectionism’s recent development as a promising line of re-
search, and if future work is successful the results will constitute a
major scientific achievement. The effort to explain the structures of
information in human cognition, rather than merely to analyze and
describe them, should be a major activity of cognitive science, espe-
cially cognitive psychology. That effort has been less salient lately
than it deserves to be, and the promise of its revitalization is impor-
tant - in the field and for its contribution to scientific knowledge at
large.”
2.5 The Advent of Modern Computational Minds: The
Physical Symbol System Hypothesis
While connectionism struggled only to reappear in the late eighties with new
models, Newell and Simon’s GPS seeded the symbolic approach in a number of
related research domains: computers, seen as systems for manipulating mental
symbols, for instantiating representations of the world, for using mathematical
logic to perform problem-solving as a paradigmatic model of thinking. This
understanding of computer models became the basis of a way of understanding
minds, as captured by The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis [37] stated by
Newell and Simon:
“A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means
for general intelligent action.”
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So intense was this philosophical conviction than, even though in the mean-
time the exaggerated claims of the AI symbolists were themselves questioned
in the famous review of academic AI research compiled by Sir Michael James
Lighthill (1924-1998)–which started what is sometimes referred to as the “AI
Winter”–the symbolic approach to general intelligent action was still considered
more successful than connectionism. The way it looked then was that con-
nectionist systems confronted a tremendous amount of mathematical analysis
and calculating to solve even the most simple problem of pattern recognition.
Symbol system, in contrast, blazed through problems like theorem proving and
hard puzzles in logic relatively effortlessly. At the time, given the speculative
nature of neurosciences, the computing power generally available, and the first
commercial successes of practical AI applications [25, 21, 35] programs based
on symbolic representations and logic processing were more than any others on
their way to being of general use.
2.6 The Philosophical Critique (1988)
As had happened thirty years before, the sometimes extravagant claims of both
the now 30-year established symbolic school and the reinvigorated PDP connec-
tionist school of thought drew intense critical fire from philosophical quarters.
Maybe two of the most devastating attacks came from Hubert Dreyfus again,
on the one hand, in his paper co-authored with his brother Stuart Making
a Mind vs. Modeling the Brain: AI Back at the Branchpoint [11], and from
Jerry A. Fodor (1935-2017) and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, on the other hand, in the
well-known book chapter Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical
Analysis [17], both published in 1988.
The Dreyfus (family) paper aimed at defending the holistic inspiration of
PDP connectionism against the anti-gestalt prejudice they saw in the symbolic
approach. But they also criticized the symbolists, focusing on the vexing ev-
eryday knowledge or common-sense problem that plagues symbol systems at
scale.
From a different viewpoint, Fodor and Pylyshyn engaged a broad clarifica-
tion of the “variety of confusions and irrelevances” that marred discussions of
the relative merits of the competing architectures of Connectionist Networks
and “Classical Computer” models. The latter they consider, in 1988, were tra-
ditionally established in Cognitive Science. The authors stated discussions of
cognitive architecture are exclusively about the representational states and pro-
cesses, at the level of explanations of the mind qualifying as cognitive. From
this standpoint, Fodor and Pylyshyn viewed both connectionists and classicists
firmly in the Representationalist camp (as contrasted with the Eliminativists,
who think that a theory of cognition could do without semantic representation,
and stay with the neurological or possibly behavioral level). They proceeded
to investigate whether the PDP connectionism could provide this level of ex-
planations of the mind, and based on empirical findings of psycholinguistics,
concluded negatively.
In their final remarks, Fodor and Pylyshyn saw the only worthwhile role of
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connectionism as one of mere implementation of the classical symbol system
model, and suggested giving up the idea that networks, quoting Rumelhart
and McClelland, were “a reasonable basis for modeling cognitive processes in
general”, and dropping the notion that all learning consists of a kind of statistical
inference realized by adjusting parameters.
2.7 The Philosophical Critique (beginning 2018)
Dramatic successes in Machine Learning in the recent contemporary period,
have led to increasing expectations, in academia and in the larger public, for
autonomous systems that exhibit human-level intelligence. These expectations,
however, have met with what a third round of critique in the 30-year cycle deems
fundamental obstacles.
2.7.1 Crouching Symbols, Hidden Layers
As already put forward by defenders of the 1988-vintage of PDP connection-
ism, today’s philosophical critique of the third wave of connectionism would be
ill-advised to saddle the “new new connectionism” with the sins and omissions
of previous theories. In 1988, Paul Smolensky published a rebuttal of the ar-
guments developed in the Fodor and Pylyshyn paper, calling On the Proper
Treatment of Connectionism (PTC) [51, 52]. PTC informed the whole next-
generation neural net research work which, in turn, lead to the unquestionable
successes of recent years.
The Proper Treatment of Connectionism Smolensky considered what
role a connectionist approach might play in cognitive modeling, as a topic of
cognitive science. He traced a first source of confusion to the conflation of public
knowledge and personal knowledge. While it is sound for scientific purposes of
definition, communication and transmission, to formalize knowledge in linguis-
tically expressed symbols and rules–what Smolensky calls cultural knowledge–it
is to be contrasted with individual knowledge, skills, and intuition which are not
driven by the same purposes, and might not be expressed linguistically.
Smolensky consequently posited two “virtual machines” in and of the mind,
a division reminiscent of the S1/S2 systems of Daniel Kahneman [24]: one for
conscious application of language-like rules and the other for “intuitive process-
ing”. It is then shown that sequential processing of linguistically formalized
rules, championed in the symbolic approach, had to be rejected as a mechanism
appropriate for the intuitive processor in favor of a properly stated connectionist
approach. PTC rejects that elements in the intuitive processor refer essentially
to the same concepts as the ones used to consciously conceptualize a task domain
in the symbolic processor.
This position statement clearly contradicts Fodor and Pylyshyn view of the
universality of the symbolic processing, the language of thought hypothesis, and
their somewhat derisive suggestion that the sole worth of neural nets could be in
possibly implementing that symbol architecture. Instead Smolensky argues for
8
an autonomous subsymbolic level, with “intuitive” knowledge, distributed in the
hidden layers, enriching the higher-level conceptual level and not of replacing
it. The Subsymbolic program, still very much active today, aims at explaining
the successes and failures of the physical symbol systems, and at accounting for
the emergence of symbolic computation out of subsymbolic computation.
Common-Sense: Scope and Limits of Symbolic AI As for Fodor and
Pylyshyn’s recommendation to confine connectionist architectures to a yet elu-
sive implementation level for higher models, Hector J. Levesque in a paper
published November 1988, in the Journal of Philosophical Logic [30], sought
to balance it with the computational burden of using logic to implement the
complexity of reasoning. Given its apparent computational difficulty, it seemed
to the author quite unlikely that logic could be at the root of normal, everyday
thinking. This resembles the common-sense argument viewed from a compu-
tational resources perspective: how is it, for instance, that we can effortlessly
answer questions like “Could a crocodile run the steeple-chase?”, when we obvi-
ously could not and do not simply remember, or perceive, their answers?
Thirty years later, Levesque [31] pursues and revises this critical appraisal,
with the hindsight of three more decades, in the same tone of voice we found in
the first Dreyfus paper in the early sixties. Why he asks, after sixty years, have
we still so little to show for knowledge representation regarding the science of
intelligent behavior? The “Knowledge is Power” slogan of the AI classicists in
the late eighties seems quite too facile today. The hurdles to symbolic AI still
stand on the start of a third cycle:
• “Much of what we come to know about the world and people
around us is due to our use of language. And yet, it appears
that we need to use extensive knowledge to make good sense of
this language.”
• “Even the most basic child-level knowledge seems to call upon
a wide range of logical constructs. And yet, symbolic reasoning
over these constructs seems to be much too demanding compu-
tationally.”
All The Turing Tests Couldn’t Put Symbols Together Again Note the
parallax in Levesque’s criticism addressed to the symbolic AI research program:
where Smolensky was interested in confronting an emerging cognitive science
to AI research–in fact, to its prominent research agenda at the time–Levesque
is interested in intelligent behavior and its confrontation to “the computational
story” told by the symbolic AI research program. (Although it could similarly
be addressed to today’s connectionists). And this parallax inevitably harks back
to the famous Turing Test.
In the AI literature, the Turing Test for intelligent behavior is more often
than not over-simplified [8] into a question-answering game, played in writing–so
that tones of voice or accents are irrelevant– between participant A and human
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“judge” J, at the end of which judge J tells whether participant A is human or
machine–an AI program, a software object, in the modern variant. The machine
playing A is successful at exhibiting intelligent behavior if it tricks judge J into
thinking that A is human. Levesque’s reproach to the Test is that a bag of really
cheap tricks might fool J but would certainly not qualify as general intelligent
behavior– wouldn’t it fall clearly into Smolensky’s cultural knowledge, and thus
be relevant to critique of the symbolic school of AI only?
However that over-simplification is completely missing the subtlety in the
original Imitation Game proposed by Turing [56]:
“The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game
which we call the ‘imitation game.’ It is played with three people,
a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of
either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other
two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine
which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He
knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says
either ‘X is A and Y is B’ or ‘X is B and Y is A.’
We now ask the question, ’What will happen when a machine takes
the part of A in this game?’ Will the interrogator decide wrongly as
often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is
played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our
original, ’Can machines think?’ “
The game, in the original, is way more challenging: in order to win, the machine
M has now to convince judge C, man or woman, that it is a woman B pretending
to be a man A. The double imitation difficulty of the original game would make it
quite unlikely that the proverbial bag of cheap tricks, that so irritates Levesque,
proved sufficient for machine M to win repeatedly.
Levesque suggests replacing the (over-simplified) Turing Test with what he
termed Winograd Schema questions such as:
• “Joan made sure to thank Susan for all the help she had given.
Who had given the help, Joan or Susan?”
• “Joan made sure to thank Susan for all the help she had re-
ceived. Who had received the help, Joan or Susan?”
which mix systematicity and compositionality, in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s accep-
tion, in finding the referent of the pronoun in the sentences. Common-sense
knowledge would be of course involved in answering, as in this other example:
• “The trophy would not fit in the brown suitcase because it was
so small. What was so small, the trophy or the suitcase?”
• “The trophy would not fit in the brown suitcase because it was
so big. What was so big, the trophy or the suitcase?”
Consideration of the original imitation game also suggests other variants for
assessing intelligent behavior (indeed pushing further the cause of Levesque’s
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irritation): the Deception Game which consists of twenty-seven rounds of Tur-
ing’s original Imitation Game, exercising all permutations of woman B, man A
and machine M in the roles of participants X and Y, and judge C ; followed by
comparison of scores on the decisions of C.
Scope and Limits of The Proper Treatment Hidden layers are also the
nemesis in the contemporary criticisms directed at the interpretability of the
current crop of connectionist models, as they used to be in the previous round.
Indeed as Machine Learning systems penetrate critical society areas such as
medicine, the criminal justice system, and financial markets, an increasing num-
ber of observer point that the inability of humans to explain neural nets’ results
becomes acutely problematic.
Zack Lipton’s illuminating discussion [33] of what desiderata are to be sat-
isfied by a proper notion of interpretability shows the notion itself to be part of
the problem. Firstly, Lipton notes, “The demand for interpretability arises when
there is a mismatch between the formal objectives of supervised learning (test
set predictive performance) and the real world costs in a deployment setting.”
Such desiderata include:
• Trust
• Transferability
• Causality
• Informativeness
• Fair and ethical decision-making
and hence the expected properties of interpretable models fall into two broad
categories: how does the model work (transparency) and what does the model
tell me (post-hoc explanations).
The author’s discussion of state-of-the-art algorithms in Machine Learning
yields to the following interim takeaways in the current round of critique:
• Linear statistical models, often resorted to for approximately
explaining how deep models work, are not strictly more inter-
pretable than deep neural networks.
• Claims about interpretability should be qualified, as there are
many definitions of interpretability out of the non exhaustive
list of desiderata above.
• In some cases transparency maybe at odds with broader objec-
tive of Machine Learning or AI. Lipton indicates: “As a concrete
example, the short-term goal of building trust with doctors
by developing transparent models might clash with the longer-
term goal of improving health care. We should be careful when
giving up predictive power, that the desire for transparency is
justified and isn’t simply a concession to institutional biases
against new methods.”
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• Post-hoc interpretations can potentially be misleading. Lipton
cautions: “against blindly embracing post-hoc notions of inter-
pretability, especially when optimized to placate subjective de-
mands. In such cases, one might–deliberately or not–optimize
an algorithm to present misleading but plausible explanations.”
Is It Symbols All The Way Down? Worries about solving the right prob-
lem with models are not only Lipton’s in the current round of critique in the
30-year cycle. The interpretability obstacle is in fact inherent to both connec-
tionist and symbolic approaches, whether old or new. The symbol grounding
problem had been identified by Stevan Harnad [20], as early as in our second
cycle in the discussion on AI: “How can the semantic interpretation of a formal
symbol system be made intrinsic to the system?” In Charles Travis’ words [54],
referring to Putnam, “how are mind and world dependent on each other?” How
can the meaning of the arbitrary, according to the physical symbol hypothesis,
tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their conventional shape, be grounded
in anything but other meaningless symbols? If not, its semantic interpretation
is nothing less than parasitic on the meaning on our heads and we are back to
issues of representation raised by Putnam and by Kripke.
Harnad’s solution is to hybridize symbols and neural nets with connectionism
a natural candidate for the missing mechanism that learns the invariant features
underlying categorical representations in reasoning. Connectionism links names
to the proximal projections of the distal objects they stand for. Symbolic func-
tions emerge as an intrinsic, dedicated symbol system relying on a bottom-up
grounding of category names in their sensory representations.
This solution, however, leaves intact the criticisms of the Dreyfuses as of the
relevance of the learned invariant features in the larger context of transferring to
a different task for instance. Moreover, lessons learned from adversarial learning
in the current generation of Deep Learning nets draw attention to how volatile
the learned features could be, blurring even further the issue of interpretability.
2.7.2 Deep Learning Without A Cause
Reminiscent of Dreyfus’ survey at the first cycle of the discussion, Gary Marcus
[34] reviews the state-of-the-art results of the widely publicized Deep Learning
variety of connectionism:
“Before the year (2012) was out, deep learning made the front page
of The New York Times, and it rapidly became the best known
technique in artificial intelligence, by a wide margin. If the general
idea of training neural networks with multiple layers was not new, it
was, in part because of increases in computational power and data,
the first time that deep learning truly became practical.”
The pattern Dreyfus identified two 30-year cycles ago can be readily observed
again:
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“A recent New York Times Sunday Magazine article, largely about
deep learning, implied that the technique is ‘poised to reinvent com-
puting itself.” ’ [32]
However, Marcus warns, the proverbial wall is near. Ten challenges are identified
as critical:
• Deep Learning thus far is data hungry, in contrast humans can
learn abstractions in a few trials. This is revisiting the issues of
which micro-features are abstracted out in the hidden layers.
• Deep Learning thus far is shallow and has limited capacity for
transfer. Confronting a deep learning neural net to scenarios
differing, even slightly, from the ones it was trained on shows
that learning was superficial.
• Deep learning thus far has no natural way to deal with hierar-
chical structure. This signals back to the language of thought
hypothesis in discussions at the second round of the 30-year
cycle.
• Deep learning thus far has struggled with open-ended inference.
This line of discussion expands on the Winograd schemes pro-
posed by Levesque as appropriate tests of intelligent behaviors.
• Deep learning thus far is not sufficiently transparent. The dis-
cussion about the opacity of “black-box” neural networks ram-
ifies from the psycholinguistic angle in the previous rounds of
critique to the current explainability or interpretability obstacle
mentioned in the previous section.
• Deep learning thus far has not been well integrated with prior
knowledge. Marcus notes that “researchers in deep learning ap-
pear to have a very strong bias against including prior knowl-
edge even when (as in the case of physics) that prior knowledge
is well known. It also not straightforward in general how to
integrate prior knowledge into a deep learning system, in part
because the knowledge represented in deep learning systems
pertains mainly to (largely opaque) correlations between fea-
tures, rather than to abstractions like quantified statements
(e.g. all men are mortal), or generics (violable statements like
dogs have four legs or mosquitos carry West Nile virus).”
• Deep learning thus far cannot inherently distinguish causation
from correlation.
• Deep learning presumes a largely stable world, in ways that
may be problematic.
• Correlatively, deep learning thus far works well as an approxi-
mation, but its answers often cannot be fully trusted. A grow-
ing array of papers focus on how deep learning nets can be
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easily fooled, showing vulnerability to cheap, and sometimes
not so cheap like in adversarial learning, Levesque tricks.
• Deep learning thus far is difficult to engineer with.
Whether these challenges, taken collectively, mount a critical attack against
the third generation connectionism–and the author’s cautious approach can
be read in the “so far” phrase–and warrant new responses from the neo-neo-
connectionists, beyond last-cycle-old PTC, is yet to be seen. A novelty, in the
list of challenges, is however apparent when compared to previous critical argu-
ments. To the obstacles of adaptability and interpretability, the previous round
of discussion already honed in on, explicit understanding of cause-effect rela-
tions is added. (Although it was argued back then that rules in the symbolic
approach could be used to capture causal inferences as well as other kinds of in-
ferences. Thus this line of discussion really belongs in the perennial symbolism-
connectionism confrontation.)
Today’s form of the causality argument, to quote Judea Pearl [39], “postu-
lates that all three obstacles mentioned above require equipping machines with
causal modeling tools, in particular, causal diagrams and their associated logic.”
From a different standpoint, this says that theoretical limitations of model-blind
machine learning, such as Deep Learning, would not apply to most tasks of pre-
diction and diagnosis, with the provision of addressing the remaining challenges
in Marcus’ list though, but only to domains where reasoning about interven-
tions (What if?) or counterfactuals (by imagination or retrospection) proves
essential, e.g. scientific thinking as well as legal and moral reasoning. While
underlying notions of industrial applications and impact in economics and soci-
ety are obviously at stake in this rephrasing of the argument, it points again to
hybrid architectural solutions as in the previous round of the 30-year cycle.
2.7.3 Neuromorphic Systems Reinvented
The argument of neural plausibility is, interestingly enough, absent, or at least
subdued, in the current round of critique. Early philosophers and neurologists
interested in cognition, like Herbert Spencer (1820-1903, John Hughlings Jack-
son (1835-1911) and Charles Sherington (1857-1952) had sophisticated views of
brain processing, based on the position that the central nervous system was a
complex product of a long evolution.
Since McCulloch and Pitts, and Rosenblatt’s Perceptron, connectionism has
been, most of the time in the past cycles, physiologically extremely implausi-
ble at the neuronal level–and sometimes deliberately so. Models proposed by
McCulloch and Pitts, Hebb, Hopfield, Rosenblatt, Smolensky and others were
avowedly simplified in order to capture only the essential features of the models
they implemented, and simply in view of the computing resources required for
their simulation.
Several workers, however, kept the neural plausibility concern alive in their
research across the returning cycles of the AI claim-critique pattern. Ter-
rence Sejnowski [44, 45, 46], Patricia Churchland [47, 6], Michael Arbib [2] and
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Stephen Grossberg [5, 19], to name only a few, directly modeled their neural
networks from consideration of the physiology of the brain. (And particularly
in investigating all non-linearities in unit processing of the elementary nodes in
neural networks.)
Even though much less publicized than today’s Deep Learning “revolution”,
which claims prompted the current round of critique, this line of work also ben-
efited from the rapid progresses in computing power of the past three decades.
Large-scale neural (brain) simulations are becoming increasingly common [9, 18].
(One billion neurons simulations were already reported in 2007 [1].)
Current state-of-the-art neuromorphic systems offer a distinctly functional
view and set of hypotheses regarding the neural mechanisms and organization
that may underlie basic cognitive functions [14]. Arguments contrasting the
neuromorphic approach with connectionism or with the symbolic approach are
not yet collected into a coordinated critique of AI. Whether neuromorphic sys-
tems then will substitute for Deep Learning and recurrent neural networks in a
yet to come fourth-round of the 30-year cycle remains to be seen.
3 Structure
The AI research community generally offered their concrete realizations, of-
ten designated by suggestive surnames (Eliza, Pandemonium, Perceptron, Logic
Theorist, General Problem Solver, Boltzmann Machine, AlphaZero, etc.) as
technical objects the very existence of which was intended to serve as a proof of
the conceptual hypotheses underlying the mind-model they illustrated. While
the first-cycle objects included electronic devices, similar to the cybernetics ar-
tifacts of the late 40s and 50s, all others, even early ones, were and are software
artifacts, often operating at the peak of the computing power available at their
times of inception.
From a methodological perspective, AI research in the 30-year cycle could be
viewed as operating in the formalism of Mathematical Logic, with its artifacts
playing the role of proof-carrying theorems in a larger theory of cognition. In
doing so, however, it should be no surprise that these objects are, and were,
interpreted quite differently by workers in other related disciplines such as lin-
guistics, psychology, neurosciences, philosophy, which by the way, very much
like AI itself, were simultaneously in flux.
These “boundary objects”, with sudden bursts of proliferation, and subse-
quent mass extinctions, appear then to return in about 30-year cycles, culmi-
nating respectively circa 1958, 1988 and 2018. At each peak, their genesis and
construction almost completely determined the nature of the sometimes heated
debates about their significance for the understanding of cognition, in the indi-
vidual and sometimes in the collective.
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3.1 An Analytical Philosophy Background
The start of the 30-year cycle should first be cast against the historical per-
spective of a reaction to associationism. The psychology theory prevailed in the
early twentieth century, as expressed in the work of the Wurzburg school. It
introduced tasks, as necessary factors in describing the process of thinking. It
also relied on systematic introspection to shed light on the state of consciousness
while performing tasks. Opponents to the latter developed a couple of diver-
gent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt-movement, which both claimed the
futility of introspection and asserted the mechanistic assumption of stimulus-
response connections as simple determinate functions of the environment for the
gestaltlists. Both rejected the mechanistic nature of associationism but refor-
mulated the task-driven nature of thinking in terms of holistic principles in the
organization of thought.
In fact the development of the modern computer from the mid-40s strength-
ened the associationist assumption in human perception and cognition initiated
by 18th century philosophers David Hume (1711-1776) and George Berkeley
(1685-1753). Associationism was expressed for instance in the stimulus-response
psychology of 19th century Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), whose emphasis on
physiological detail in biological evolution, however inaccurate, strongly influ-
enced both psychologists and physiologists: thinking should be analyzable into
simple determinate operations (in complete opposition to the gestaltists).
This is readily visible in the first-cycle discussions. Notwithstanding Newell,
Shaw and Simon’s 1958 claims to have synthesized a common view from associationist-
gestaltist extremes, Dreyfus considered that strengthening as misconstrued when:
• empirical evidence of the associationist assumption can be questioned on
the grounds of a critique of the scientific methodology in cognitive simu-
lation, and
• the apriori argument for associationism when properly rephrased turns
inconclusive, “we need not conclude from the claim that all physical pro-
cesses can be described by in a mathematical formalism which can in
turn be manipulated by a digital computer that all human information
processing can be carried out as discrete processes on a digital machine”.
The criticism was all the more to the point, at the time, than the early 20th
century thread of associationism in behaviorism, championed by e.g. John B.
Watson (1878-1958) and Clark L. Hull (1884-1952), came to be generally aban-
doned or deeply transformed by contemporary and later behaviorists such as
B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) and Edward C. Tolman (1856-1959).
It is in fact the structure of the cyclic discussion, poised against the back-
ground of the increasing prevalence of the man-machine metaphor in the an-
alytical philosophy of mind, that helped define cognitive science as a distinct
endeavor. In other words, the major question addressed by outside research
communities in their analyses of the technical objects of AI, has been aptly
expressed by Van Gelder in 1995 [57] : “What might cognition be if not compu-
tation?”
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3.2 From Mind-Body to Man-Machine
Turning then to analytical philosophy, the structure of the discussion is explic-
itly clarified by Minds and Machines (1960) [40], where Putnam revisited the
centuries-long mind-body debate:
“The various issues that make up the traditional mind-body prob-
lem are wholly linguistic and logical in character.[. . . ] all the issues
arise in connection with any computing system capable of answering
questions about its own structure and have thus nothing to do with
the unique nature (if it is unique) of human subjective experience.”
This is the core of Dreyfus’ critical appraisal of AI at the first revolution of
the 30-year cycle. Indeed, the general interest in the so-called “electronic brains”
was used by analytical philosophers, on the one hand, to recast the historical
debate dividing behaviorists from Cartesians; and by moralists and philosophers,
on the other hand, to claim that higher forms of human behavior were beyond
the powers of any machine (not only of then current state-of-the-art electronic
computers).
Both parties however, noted Dreyfus, “credulously assumed that highly in-
telligent artifacts had already been developed.” Dreyfus drew attention to how
much the AI boundary objects of 1958 were psychologically unconvincing and
therefore did not warrant the significance they were so generously granted.
Table 1: Controversial features in the first cycle critique
Human Information Processing * Machine Information Processing*
Fringe of consciousness Heuristically guided search
Essence/Accident Discrimination Trial and Error
Ambiguity Tolerance Exhaustive Enumeration
Continuous processes Discrete/Determinate Associationism
The argument is about the distinctive features of human versus machine
information processing, as summarized in table Information Processing. The
table is used to disqualify a strong form of associationism–in which the assertion
that human information processing is explicable in discrete, step-wise, symbolic
only terms, is claimed to be based on and to explain descriptions of human
experience and behavior–is untenable.
Dreyfus recognized, however, that the realization that basing cognition only
on a representational associationist model (namely, the physical symbol system
hypothesis) is unfounded, leaves untouched the weaker claim that human in-
telligent behavior, not information processing, can be simulated using digital
computers. Although invoking the computing power argument, in considering
the computer state-of-the-art current at the time Dreyfus wrote, he could raise
serious doubts about the computing and time resources that would be involved
in implementing the simplest physical process in the brain. Today the com-
puting argument is rarely, if even, mentioned as it is generally assumed that
available processing resources surpass the brain’s.
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As research product artifacts, LT and GPS were intentionally designed by
their authors to “maximally” confuse the attempt to accomplish with machines
the same tasks that humans perform, and the attempt to simulate the processes
humans actually use to accomplish these tasks. Nonetheless, from the origin of
the cycles, there seems to be a conceptual divide between appreciations of the
scientific worth of machine artifacts, computers and electronic devices in 1958,
software and algorithms in subsequent cycles, that simulate or reproduce human
cognition, and artifacts that implement physiological brain functions, in view of
exhibiting intelligent behavior. This debate, and in its cyclic 30-year return, is
both purposely anti-behaviorist and centered on the individual task-performing
mind.
3.3 What science for cognitive science?
By 1988 and the second peak in the 30-year cycle, the evolution of founda-
tional ideas in the research communities parties to the AI discussion called for
a reinterpretation of the technical artifacts it produced and had produced.
By that time, the “cognitive science” research program had been installed
and stood on firmer grounds. In the same intervening three decades, the mount-
ing prevalence of the discrete digital, “associationistic”, computer as instrument
and metaphor of the mind went almost unchallenged. The physical symbol
hypothesis had become the orthodox view in AI research, with a minority of
research groups still working on alternatives, in the cold of this first AI Winter.
Meanwhile, technical progresses in computing processing, memory, algo-
rithms and software narrowed the AI discussion to the confrontation of the new
wave of PDP connectionism to the then well-entrenched orthodoxy of symbolic
systems.
In this context, the Dreyfuses 1988 critique is still focused on the divide of
the earlier cycle, inspired by their earlier anti-associationism campaign, although
now confronting the then new Hinton- and Rumelhart-McClelland PDP brand
of neural networks [43] to the background context of representational cognitive
systems, derived from the physical symbol system hypothesis. (Expert Systems
had started to pop up in successful commercial applications [12]). Much of the
philosophical structure in their 1958 criticism still held in 1988, although now
informed (i) by their revisiting of Heidegger’s work, into which Dreyfus had em-
barked in the meantime, and (ii) by the acknowledgment of the vexing problem
of common-sense knowledge representation confronting symbolic systems.
Table 2: The Mind-Brain Modeling Branchpoint in the 1988 AI critique
Making a Mind Modeling the Brain
Symbolic information processing Subsymbolic
Sequential discrete execution Parallel distributed execution
Husserl, early Wittgenstein Heidegger, late Wittgenstein
Common-Sense obstacle problem Everyday know-how
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The critique addressed both the symbolic school of AI and new connection-
ists. The latter, according to the authors, “influenced by symbol manipulating
AI, are expending considerable effort, once their nets have been trained to per-
form a task, trying to find the features represented by individual nodes or sets
of nodes. But sometimes most nodes in neural nets cannot be interpreted se-
mantically at all, so that effort is wasted and in fact misconstrued. Of course,
any successfully trained multi-layer network has, if in a limited sense, an inter-
pretation in terms of (distributed) features or symbols. The question is whether
or not this interpretation preserves the rationalist intuition that these symbols
must capture the supposedly invariant, essential structure of the task domain,
and not some accidental features of the training dataset, to base a theory of the
mind on them.”
Evidently this is a profound criticism, that resurfaces in today’s episode
on the interpretability of hidden layers, if differently expressed. Should it be
even possible to find some meaning in the hidden layers of neural nets–and the
Dreyfuses insist that this was questionable indeed and still is–how do we make
sure that these hidden layers symbols are not just spurious side-effects of the
nature or volume of the training set? In this critical view, 1988-vintage new-
connectionism, and likewise 2018-vintage one may add, sheds no light on human
cognition.
Furthermore, common-sense knowledge, argued as distinctive of human cog-
nition and falling clearly into the symbolic camp according to Smolensky [52],
was similarly problematic for both parties [29, 28] at the time.
Both strong arguments were used in a critique, not of misconstruing human
information processing as in the Dreyfus’ review of early AI efforts, but of what
would be the proper scientific method for a budding cognitive science. Shouldn’t
the “cognitive science” variant of AI research produce models that enlighten the
understanding of human cognitions?
Compared to the previous round in the AI discussion, the novelty was then
in shifting the target of the critique to the topic of scientific methods in cogni-
tive science. The shift defines the background of the whole 1988 debate. For
instance: in examining the vexing question he himself asked, Van Gelder [57]
offered that an alternative view to cognitive systems being computational could
be that they simply be dynamical systems. (Ironically enough, in an operations-
research sense which was much in currency circa 1958!) His discussion of the
classical “cybernetic” task accomplished by the Watt centrifugal governor sug-
gested a few principles to retain for a young cognitive science:
• various kinds of systems, fundamentally different in nature and
requiring very different tools for their understanding, can sub-
serve sophisticated tasks–including interacting with a changing
environment;
• our sense that a specific cognitive task must be subserved by
a computational system may be due to deceptively compelling
preconceptions about how systems solving complex tasks must
work;
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• cognition may be the behavior of some (non computational)
dynamical system.
Picking up examples from Economics and Psychology, Van Gelder points to
Decision Field Theory [4] as illustrative of the latter point. The principles,
however, leave open the question of whether or not the brain is such a dynamical
system or a computational system.
In his proposed three-species classification of cognitive systems, new connec-
tionism appears only as a hybrid:
Table 3: State-dependent Systems Classification by Van Gelder (1995)
Species Characteristics
Computational Classical Turing Machine model
Dynamical States are numerical, rules of evolutions specify
sequences, often continuous (ODE), of such states.
Connectionism They are dynamical systems in the above definition,
albeit specific: high-dimensional, homogeneous and
“neural” in the sense of local activation being a form
of integration of connected neighbors’ activation.
But the connectionism of circa 1988 is found to
retain much of the basic structure of the computational
picture, maybe simply changing the nature of the
representations (what the symbols stand for).
3.3.1 Internal Debate: Crossing The Divide
The frontline, all within cognitive science itself, pitched defenders of the sym-
bolic approach against neo-connectionists. The structure was set by the heated
dialogue between Fodor and Pylyshyn, on the one hand, and Smolensky and
followers, on the other. Heavy reference to analytical philosophy was present all
over the debate. It was used to amplify the vacillation, noted by van Gelder, of
new connectionism between representationalism–the expensive effort to find a
proper explanation of the performance of neural networks mentioned above–and
the claim that the cognitive level is altogether disposable in favor of a biologi-
cally inspired one.
It is interesting to note that the crux of the dispute is articulated around
features of language, such as productivity and systematicity, that had been well
established by empirical psycholinguistics research in the intervening decades,
and how they could be found or not in the neural net performance.
In the philosopher’s eye, features of language are used as “proxies” for fea-
tures of thought that a cognitive architecture should account for. This position
is not really discussed in Smolensky’s defense: Proper Treatment of Connection-
ism (PTC) [52, 51]. In it a novel subsymbolic paradigm is suggested instead,
as a solution to the richer behavior exhibited in psycholinguistic mind studies.
This behavior appeared governed by complex systems of rules but nonetheless
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Table 4: Structure of the Insiders’ 1988 Argument Against New Connectionism
The Need for Symbol Systems Failures of New Connectionism
Productivity of thought: classical Combination of parts as a basic
argument for the existence of operation runs against the hypothesis
the existence of combinatorial of parallel distributed processing.
structure in any rich enough
representational system.
Systematicity of cognitive There might not be structural relations
representation. between mental representations captured
by a neural net that correspond to
systematically linked thoughts.
Compositionality of representations, Commitment to mental representations
which result as a consequence of without combinatorial structure precludes
combining productivity and compositionality. (Hard-liners are even
systematicity arguments. tempted to reject it altogether.)
Systematicity of Inference: inferences Neural nets are indifferent as to whether
of a similar logic type ought similar nodes or sets of nodes represent
to elicit correspondingly similar logical inferences of a similar type, as
cognitive capacities. representations are distributed.
still awash in variance, flexibility and fluidity, deviation and exceptions. Posited
between the neural level and the conceptual level, both of them unquestioned,
this subsymbolic level would account for individual private knowledge, distin-
guished from a cultural and social form of knowledge driven by conscious rule
interpretation.
PTC is used by Smolensky to rebuke Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claims [51]:
• connectionist models do support complex representations found in sym-
bolic systems based on composition of, in PTC distinctively, distributed,
representations of constituents;
• if the constituency relationship among distributed representations is im-
portant for the analysis of connectionist models–still with the back-of-
the-mind idea to emerge symbols from activation patterns in the hidden
layers–it is emphatically not a causal mechanism within the model; there
is no necessity for a neural net, in order to process a complex represen-
tation, to decompose it into its constituents, a property already noted
in the Dreyfuses analysis. The arbitrariness in which the constituents
are defined in the hidden layers introduce no ambiguity in the way the
representation is processed. The ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder:
attempts to formalize the notion of constituency in PTC crucially involves
approximation.
PTC, as a tentative rebuttal of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s language-of-thought
inspired critique, calls on the familiar reductionism to try crossing the divide
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Table 5: Smolensky’s Defense of the Subsymbolic Level
The Simplistic (and Incorrect) The PTC Defense
Analysis of Connectionism
All representations are atomistic. Representing entire logical propositions
by individual nodes is not typical
of connectionist models.
Connectionist processing is strictly Mental states are described by distributed
association, which is sensitive to activation levels ascribing to them a
statistics, not to structure. proper compositional structure, but in
an approximate sense, not equivalent
to algebraic combinations of
context-independent representations.
One class of knowledge Distinct individual and socio-cultural
knowledge bodies and representations
between artificial neural nets and symbolic representations. Actually it conflates
the claim that mental states may be reduced to, or analyzed into, physical states
and the weaker claim that one class of states could not exist without the other.
Hence the various forms of hybrid technical objects that were proposed to solve
the conundrum [27][22][51].But, in contrast to Frege’s “eternal thoughts”, the
1988 debate has been narrowed to discussing reduction of representations in
symbols and logic to models of neuronal events in connectionist artificial nets,
both simulated in silico by software programs–so they both reduce to physical
events after all, and hence are only a matter of language.
3.3.2 External Debates: Foundational Challenges
While the Cognitive Science program matured as a valid, independent line of
research, discussions also went unabated in the related disciplines from which
most of the critique originated. Some of the questions raised in debates in
psychology and in the philosophy of mind also impacted the previous and current
interpretations in the AI critique. Arguments, explicitly evoked in the 1988
wave, proved not immune themselves to criticism from outside AI circles.
Questioning Systematicity In examining the systematicity of language and
thought, an argument of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s against PDP connectionism,
Kent Johnson (1970-2017) expressed skepticism [23] about the fundamental
claims of psycholinguistics that:
• systematicity of language is taken to be trivially true;
• systematicity is so clearly defined that it needs only a cursorily sketch.
Johnson’s analysis convincingly shows that natural intuitive characteriza-
tions of the claim that language is systematic are false and that systematicity of
thought is at least as problematic as systematicity of language, pace Fodor. In
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fact, the linguistic natural kinds with which language is working do form a com-
plex overlapping structure rather than a clear-cut partition–the approximation
defended by Smolensky above.
Given this complex structure, it becomes unclear what it would be for natu-
rals language to be systematic, and the jump to systematicity of thought appears
even more elusive. Does that vindicate new connectionism? Not really: the ev-
idential status of connectionism is unaltered. Indeed it may well be thought
that a connectionist artifact, properly trained, has indeed learned a systematic
language, as Smolensky advocates in his PTC, but in doing so has only induced
an empirically an incorrect organization of natural kinds of expressions, as the
Dreyfuses suspected in their 1988 paper.
Systematicity of the lexicon has also been challenged: Jeffrey Elman (1948-
2018) argued that empirical data are problematic for the view of the lexicon–the
inventory of symbols in the representational model–as an enumerative database
[16]. (Which could count, by the way, as a minor failure of the computer-model
of the mind [55].) The richness of lexical knowledge, as demonstrated by this
“workhorse” of the psycholinguistic literature, the study of how comprehenders–
human or artificial–process sentences, is revealed in its quite detailed nature.
The processing is idiosyncratic and verb specific. Lexical knowledge is brought
to bear at the earliest stage possible in incremental sentence processing but
dynamic factors such as the verb’s grammatical aspect, and the agent and in-
strument involved, may significantly alter this process.
The idea that the form of the lexicon has no consequences for symbol pro-
cessing is an essential tenet of the physical symbol system hypothesis. But that
entails that performance tells us little about competence and that conclusion
defeats the purpose of studying cognitive architectures in silico as a scientific
method. Elman suggested an alternative to the lexicon-as-dictionary with a
lexicon as a dynamical system, a la Van Gelder, and implemented a model
demonstration as a recurrent neural network, in which feedback loops allow the
current state of the system to be affected by prior states. In doing so, Elman
himself suggested an hybrid technical object for consideration as a cognitive
architecture.
Questioning Semantic Categories In her pioneering psychological study
of cognitive representations, Eleanor Rosch [41] demonstrated that:
• “the internal structure of superordinate semantic categories was
clearly a pervasive aspect of the way in which they were pro-
cessed in the tasks” in the experiments; (cognitive representa-
tions appeared to be more similar to the good examples than
to the poor examples)
• “meaning could affect perception”, there are several levels of
processing over which internal structures of categories have se-
lective effects;
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• “there is tentatively a meaning of superordinate categories, not
specifically coded in terms of words or pictures but translated
into a format in preparation for actual perception.”
These findings supported the emergence of an ambitious theory, or more
properly a class of theories, in the psychological research of the seventies and
the eighties. Generally called Prototype Theory it states that entities fall neither
sharply in nor sharply out of a concept’s extension. An object instantiates a
concept to the extent that it is similar, in a properly defined measure, to the
prototype of the concept.
While Prototype Theory, in construing membership in a concept’s exten-
sion as graded, would seem to call on psychological empirical research to help
Smolensky’s PTC claim of approximation as a crucial ingredient in a cognitive
architecture, Daniel Osherson and Edward E. Smith (1940-2012) revisited its
compatibility with two criteria of adequacy for full-fledged theories of concepts,
namely the relationship between complex concepts and their constituents (com-
binatorial compositionality in the 1988 critique), and the truth conditions for
thoughts corresponding to simple inclusions [38].
The truth condition characterizes the circumstances under which thoughts,
taken to be immediately constituted by concepts, are true in classical syllogisms
(All A’s are B’s, Some B’s are C’s and so forth). Considering many forms of
measure of psychological similarity used in Prototype Theory–distance, num-
ber of common features, weighted contrast between common and distinctive
features–the authors systematically derived logical contradictions in the truth
values Prototype Theory assigned to composed thoughts.
Interestingly enough, the contradiction always stemmed from the possibil-
ity of two constituents (“crocodiles” and “steeple-chase runners”) of a logically
empty set (“crocodiles that can run the steeple-chase”) to have individual non-
null characteristic functions, and therefore strictly positive when combined. Also
ambiguities appear in combined set definitions (“some crocodiles, say this par-
ticular alligator, could, that ran the hundred-meter hurdles”).
The reconciliation offered by the authors between traditional theories of
concepts and prototype theories, namely that the former should be used for
core concept procedures explicating its relation to other concepts while the latter
should be used for identification procedure specifying the kind of information
to make rapid decisions, did not seem to argue in favor of disposing of either
one of the symbolic and subsymbolic levels. The proposed reconciliation is in
fact not only reminiscent of the division between reasoning and perception which
underlies most of the critique, but would favor another form of hybrid solutions.
With basic hypotheses of the symbolists’ critique of connectionism being
themselves questioned on logical and psychological grounds, the great divide in
cognitive architecture seems even more challenging to cross.
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4 Conclusion
It is apt and relevant, if ironical, at the end of spinning out three times the philo-
sophical arguments in the recurring critique of AI, to quote Putnam’s somewhat
radical conclusion of his Mind and Machine paper, back at the eve of the first
cycle:
“the mind-body problem is strictly analogous to the problem of the
relation between structural and logical states [in a Turing Machine],
not that the two problems are identical. [. . . ] if the so-called mind-
body problem is nothing but a different realization of the same set
of logical and linguistic issues, then it must be empty and just as
verbal.
Consideration of the abundant literature making up the on-going discussion on
the AI critique scene sheds light on an apparent 30-year recurrence of waves
of philosophical criticisms peaking around 1958, 1988 and 2018. It starts with
an observable pattern, “early, dramatic success followed by sudden unexpected
difficulties”, generating assaults from related scientific disciplines, mainly psy-
cholinguistics, psychology, philosophy and increasingly–maybe even more so in
further cycles if any–neuroscience. A form of “AI Winter” generally follows the
latter heated exchanges, which invariably center around interpretations of the
technical productions of AI–electronic devices in cybernetic times and in the
early cycle, increasingly sophisticated software artifacts in later cycles–that beg
to differ.
Often in the deep of these AI winters, muted theoretical advances are made in
unabated research communities which, combined with the (definitely non-cyclic
but rather linear, if not polynomial) advances in computing processing power
and memory, feed he next generation of dramatic successes. Looking at these
successive technical artifacts as boundary objects helps charting a taxonomy of
the arguments in the subsequent exchanges of critique and defense.
In the tradition of analytical philosophy, Cognitive Science was born in a
new attempt at reductionism based on the advent of the modern computer, try-
ing to cross the brain-mind divide using machine software both as a metaphor
and an instrument. In a 30-year cyclic repetition of a pattern identified early
on by Dreyfus, the critique of the technical successes in AI shows invariant
structure: postulating intermediate levels of explanations, usually one, called
“subsymbolic”, to help cross the divide or to show reduction, or abstraction, to
be altogether impossible. Additional pro and contra arguments, developed in
outside disciplines related to AI, were opportunistically brought in at different
times. Today’s neuromorphic systems could be said to add one more hypotheti-
cal biologically-inspired level into the mix, adding more philosophical questions
about analyzing any level into others.
Each return of the cycle showed a shift in the core debate. Circa 1958, the
question of comparing information processing in humans and in machine was
critical. Circa 1988, the debate around competing cognitive architectures, and
their possible hybridization, relayed the underlying concern about the proper
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scientific methods and goals of Cognitive Science. But in both occasions, most
parties to the discussion credulously assumed that highly intelligent artifacts had
already been developed. The reiterated difficulties in addressing the challenges
of a maturing cognitive science repeatedly show how premature this hypothesis
was.
And still is. The shift of the current critical debate on AI is increasingly
towards ethical and socio-economics questions. It is observable in a time when
concerns about AI [13] are escalated to national levels, and the new dramatic
successes of technical artifacts (autonomous cars, lethal autonomous weapons,
drug discovery and personalized medicine, smart courtroom machines, board
game and video game players, voice-controlled home systems, etc.) are the
current boundary objects. Dystopian predictions about General Artificial In-
telligence, Singularity, or Superintelligence have prompted administrations and
governments to start “AI Governance” multidisciplinary research programs. But
Dreyfus’s admonition of 1958 on the prematureness of interpretation still rings
true, and the sobering conclusions of Putnam should indeed not be forgotten:
“To put it differently, if the mind-body problem is identified with any
problem of more than conceptual interest (e.g. with the question of
whether or not human beings have ‘souls’), then either it must be
that (a) no argument ever used by a philosopher sheds the slightest
light on it, or (b) that some philosophical argument for mechanism
is correct, or (c) that some dualistic argument does show that both
human beings and Turing Machines have souls! I leave it to the
reader to decide which of the three alternatives is at all plausible.”
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